END OF HISTORY, BEGINNING OF HISTORY- India Pak relation beyond Shimla Agreement.

 

In the aftermath of “Surgical Strike” by India, let us try to understand the background and emerging scenario. We will try to understand it in terms of- History of Partition, Shimla Agreement, SAARC, Indus Water Treaty, MFN, Balochistan- all the words and issues that dominated the discourse for last whole month. We will also try to understand economic and geopolitical situation of Pakistan as against India for correct response. Last but not the least, human suffering and the economic cost  due to sour relation/ war for both the countries will be discussed.  

1. History of Partition till date.

The bitterness and greed that marked the Partition is yet to be forgotten. The partition was mainly based on religious line and continuity of land area. But there was a problem with the state of Junagadh; with a Muslim ruler, it was contiguous to West Pakistan but its population was largely Hindu. Similarly, the Maharaja of Kashmir was a Hindu, but the majority population was largely Muslim. So following the Junagadh example (which was taken over by India), Pakistan made a strong case for Kashmir. Thus the fate of Kashmir was a major contest between the newly formed Pakistan and a truncated India.

What happened next was that the Jawaharlal Nehru government sent a plebiscite resolution ( Janmat Sangrah -to determine what public wants) to the UN. Then, the Maharaja signed an instrument of accession in favour of India. The outstanding and unrivalled leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah was convinced by Nehru that he would work in the interests of the Kashmiris and self-rule. Nehru's successors like his redoubtable daughter Indira Gandhi made no attempt to fulfill the promises to Sheikh Abdullah. In the UN, resolutions put on the table were clearly not acceptable to one side or another. Eventually, the UN threw up its hands. Thus Pakistan has an enduring grouse: what about the plebiscite? India argues that successive elections have proved majority support.

Two countries also fought wars, last full-fledged one being 1971, which saw emergence of Bangla Desh. Post war PM Indira Gandhi offered the Pakistani leadership the Shimla Accord, which the Pakistanis reinterpreted as suited them.

Virtually the whole world and certainly the great powers are fully aware that this is a very knotty problem. Pakistan has decided to do a Bangladesh on India. The terrorist attacks on India are meant to bleed India, as India allegedly did in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh. Since the positions of both sides are embedded in their nationalism, and both are nuclear weapons states, the situation is grim.

2. Shimla Agreement and dumping of it.

While Shimla Agreement was historic in the sense that it barred third party mediation in both country’s outstanding disputes (technically making UN resolution obsolete), it seems Modi Govt. is now giving shape to new aggressive policies that will put our relations with Pakistan not in spirit/ bound by 45 year old agreement. It is this angel that makes “Surgical Strike” so important. Importance of strike lies in its significance and not in its detail. The substance, strategic issue is: India made the public statement it did. This redefines the India-Pakistan relationship here on. It also firmly signals the end of continuity from Indian side. This is Modi saying “History begins here and Now”.

Historically, since trouble returned to the Valley in 1989, and terror made its first appearance in mainland India with the Bombay serial blasts of 1993, certain postulates have evolved over time to define India’s response. One, not to “internationalize” the “bilateral” Kashmir problem (as per Shimla Agreement). Linked to this is second principle ( as per Shimla Agreement) renaming the old ceasefire line(CFL) as Line of Controll (LOC) conferred on it the status of a defacto border affirming the division of Kashmir along it which the two countries were to formalize at a more opportunate time Both side respected it until 1989 and India till surgical strike. Till date all later peace proposals were centered on it. This is over now. As, Pakistan was taking things granted as per Shimla Agreement and was trying to get more, now India has decided to reciprocate.

3. SAARC

SAARC stands for South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Post Uri we all begin to wonder whether SAARC is considered an instrument for regional cooperation or regional instability. It is perhaps appropriate to recall that a Sri Lanka writer, considering the regional squabbles in South Asia at the time of the first SAARC summit in 1987 wrote: Let’s not be Saarcastic.

The organization was formed 31 years ago with hope to uplift millions, but it never did really take off the ground. India the biggest of the seven nations was at the geographical centre and it was at the centre of most of the controversies. By the time SAARC was formed Indo-Lanka relations were simmering (with Sri Lanka alleging, India sponsoring cross-border terrorism to Sri Lanka with separatist Tamil terrorist camps being established in Tamil Nadu). When the Sri Lanka government launched a military operation to drive out the LTTE camps from Jaffna, India declared that it would not tolerate the Sri Lankan forces capturing Jaffna town which finally resulted in an Indian Peace Keeping Force landing in Sri Lanka. Pakistan however continued to assist Sri Lanka with armaments throughout the 30-year war.

It will be recalled that during the intervention of India in East Pakistan to create a separate state Bangladesh, Sri Lanka permitted Pakistani military officials to pass through Colombo from West to East Pakistan. That friendship created in 1971 held during Sri Lanka’s 30-year terrorist war and continues today.

A strategy to punish Pakistan diplomatically for its alleged attacks was to isolate it diplomatically. In this attempt the India attempted to frog march SAARC members to the Indian side and one country targeted was Sri Lanka. But not succeeded so far. Sri Lanka pointed out that under the SARRC Convention the moment that one country says it is not able to attend a SAARC Summit, it cannot be held and so no question of pulling out in support of India.

Rationally speaking, for India to destroy a South Asian Summit for Regional Cooperation with the objective of punishing its arch foe Pakistan that was hosting the summit makes no sense. Pakistan is hosting the Summit on a rotational basis among member states and has no proprietarily claims over the SAARC summit. Those who went by India’s decision may be small but they also know geo-politics. Barring Afghanistan, their borders touch India’s borders, not Pakistan’s.

Herein lies the bane of Saarc. It is so much overshadowed by the India-Pakistan encounter that it has become nothing but a failed experiment.  Thus Saarc Summit meeting which is supposed to be an annual affair is still debating its 19^th (Eight time cancelled, due to bilateral issues), which ideally should have been its 31^st. Yet, strangely, the Saarc constitution prohibits any discussion on bilateral matters.

As Kashmir dispute lingered, the infrastructural link-up needed for regional connectivity suffered. And without a viable infrastructural link-up providing facilities for transit across the length and breadth of region, the trade within the region and beyond it to market regional produce did not materialize. No wonder that intra-regional trade is as little as 4.6% of the region’s total international trade. Here is some comparison: it is 40% in North American Free Trade Agreement, 26% in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and 67% in European Union. Further, the region accounts for about 25% of the world’s population but contributes barely 2.5% to the global trade, that too primarily because of India.

All this has brought SAARC to a critical point. Can it go on without India? India perhaps did not want SAARC from its inception when the support it extended to SAARC is considered. Has India always been and still is Saarcastic about SAARC? Reality is, the two principal members of Saarc, India and Pakistan have other ambitions. It is generally the view in India that for the failure of Saarc, Pakistan is responsible. The fact is that India is equally responsible. India has found/developed the substitute of Saarc in sub-regional and sub-regional plus cooperation (less Pakistan) looking eastward and Pakistan has found the same by looking extra regionally westward and also towards China in a big way.

Here Two factors matter the most ( for failure/success), one, India’s unprecedented rise yet not enough to impress its neighbours that much, and two, the shadow of China which provides a constant source of anxiety to India but which is a positive factor for the rest of the region. (Observe oscillation of Nepal and Srilanka, between India and China). Islamabad had also tried to push China’s membership, much to India’s discomfort.

The bottom-line is that the sooner the 19th Summit is held, the better. It should not be anybody’s case that the present stand-off between India and Pakistan should be allowed to linger indefinitely, for it is pregnant with dangerous possibilities. There is no other organization than Saarc that is particularly suited to facilitate this process, its general failure notwithstanding.

3. Indus Waters Treaty

In light of media reports of reviewing/ revoking the treaty, it should be understood that there are procedural limitations (there is no exit clause in it and according the sub-provisions (3) and (4) of the Article XII of the IWT, the Treaty cannot be altered or revoked unilaterally) of India unilaterally taking up any water development projects on these rivers in the absence of Pakistan’s consent. Under the provisions of the treaty, Pakistan can complain about any Indian project upstream and the World Bank has the power to appoint a “neutral expert” to decide. Even if India’s projects upstream are within the provisions of the treaty, as was the case in the Baglihar hydropower project, Pakistan can delay India’s plans for a long time if it decides to. Also Pakistan’s all weather friend China, by putting hurdles in the flow of Brahmaputra River can create problem for us.

We should remember that much before the Uri attacks, water sharing in the Indus basin had become a major political predicament in the face of increasing water demand and climate change-related uncertainties.  Indus Waters Treaty has stood the test of time for the last 56 years, but the deep mistrust between India and Pakistan has thwarted the implementation of a number of seemingly advantageous water development projects in the basin.

Though the treaty is over river waters, it is designed primarily to split the river system in two, not to encourage cooperative sharing of its waters. The Indus Waters Treaty, in facilitating the partition of the river system between the two countries, has in fact contributed to reducing the scope of engagement between them. The treaty is not a marriage of two consenting adults to lead a life together, but has turned out to be a mutually agreed divorce settlement. Though the best possible use of Indus waters needs both the major riparian countries to work together for the development of water infrastructure, the treaty, unfortunately, does not encourage any incentive towards joint basin management.

The frequent fight over the interpretation of the treaty has also raised serious doubts over any peace dividend coming out of it for the two countries. Moreover, conflict over water sharing is not limited at the bilateral level between India and Pakistan only but within countries also.

The Indian states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan continue to fight over their rightful share of the waters of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej). The same is the case among the provinces of Pakistan, who regularly quarrels with one another over the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Even Kashmiris believe that the state of Jammu and Kashmir has the potential to produce 20,000 MW of hydropower, enough to make the state energy self-reliant.

To solve problem, for over 10 years, the World Bank has been promoting a negotiation process, called the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, among the countries in the Indus and Ganges-Brahmaputra basin to explore ways for basin-based cooperation on shared river systems. When this process started in 2006 in Abu Dhabi, it is argued that the Indus Waters Treaty has outlived its utility and both India and Pakistan should work towards revising it. They also need to bring two other riparian countries of the basin, Afghanistan and China, to the ambit of the new treaty.

For appropriate and competent management of Indus systems, it is necessary to explore establishing an effective and independent river basin organization, involving all the four riparian states, which will have the capability of taking decisions on its own and remain out of the political control of any national government. Under an integrated programme of basin development, water projects can be situated at optimum locations, notwithstanding geographic divisions along political lines.

Thus, instead of the urge to take revenge against Pakistan, if India takes the opportunity to work for a comprehensive and integrated form of basin management, the benefit sharing of the Indus river system will not be limited only to water resources; it can have other peace-enhancing effects and significantly contribute to regional peace, security and development. If our government is really serious about making better use of the Indus waters, the formed ministerial panel should explore the possibility of how to make the treaty wider and better to meet the increasing water and energy needs of the region.

4. MFN- Most Favoured Nation.

In light of Uri attack, there is demand that India withdrew MFN satutus to Pakistan. But first understand MFN, then our options and consequences of our decision.

What is Most Favoured Nation status?

According to the MFN principle of the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) — to which India is a signatory/contracting party — each of the WTO member countries should “treat all the other members equally as ‘most-favored’ trading partners.”

The WTO says, "Grant someone a special favor (such as a lower customs duty rate) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members." Hence, though MFN sounds like special treatment, in effect it means non-discrimination.

Have Pakistan and India accorded MFN status to each other?

The MFN status was accorded to Pakistan in 1996 as per India’s commitments as a WTO member. But Pakistan has not reciprocated, reportedly citing “non-tariff barriers” erected by India as well as huge trade imbalance. According to the WTO’s report on the Trade Policy Review of Pakistan (in 2015), “Pakistan is in the process of offering India Non-Discriminatory Market Access" (similar to MFN).

What will happen if India revokes Pakistan's MFN status?

If India chooses to do so there won’t be any significant trade fallout as the level of bilateral trade is “very low” — representing a minuscule 0.4 per cent of India’s overall goods trade worth $643.3 billion in 2015-16.

What will be the political fallout of such an action by India?

Though it will have only a “symbolic” impact in trade terms, politically it could result in India losing goodwill in the South Asian region, where it enjoys a trade surplus and is a party to a free trade pact called SAFTA, which also includes Pakistan. The move may also not go down well at the WTO-level.

What are India’s options?

India could consider making use of a ‘security exception’ clause -- Article 21(b)(iii) -- in the GATT to deny the MFN status to Pakistan or bring in certain trade restrictions.

What should Indian officials keep in mind while considering using the Article 21 provision?

According to a paper by Shailja Singh of the Centre for WTO Studies at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, “GATT and WTO practice shows that the countries have by and large observed self restraint in using the national security exception.

5. Balochistan

One of the strategy that India is openly pursuing now ( like acknowledging surgical strike), is support to “Balochis” for their struggle against Pakistan as a counterweight for Pakistan support to Kashmir.

Thus, India plans to provide an Indian home for Baloch nationalist leader Brahamdagh Bugti. But providing Bugti a place to set up a “government-in-exile” or its equivalent is the easy part. Next is hard one. The mixed history of India’s involvement with Balochistan is a reminder that this is an extremely difficult ploy to use successfully. The record, however, does seem to indicate that civil society gambits like Bugti as opposed to supplying weapons to insurgents may be the most effective means to put this thorn back into Pakistan’s side.

History.

Balochistan is in the throes of its fifth insurgency since being taken over by Pakistan. Most have lasted only one or two years. When they have been longer it is often because they secured external backing. Russian and Iraqi support ensured the 1973 insurgency lasted four years. The last round began in 2004 and went on until 2012. Pakistani military sources, speaking privately, name the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul and, through him, New Delhi as the foreign hands of this period.

Since 2014 the Baloch insurgency has become a low key affair. The Pakistani security forces have gotten on top of the Baloch who are now low on funds, arms and facing extreme repression. Thus, direct Indian support to the Baloch insurgents would not be impossible and revive a relationship wound down or redirected through third governments after the 1980s.

But there are a number of things to keep in mind.

One, it will be more difficult for India to make Balochistan a matter of international concern for Pakistan than it will be for Islamabad to do the same with Kashmir for New Delhi. Baloch insurgencies never achieved the sort of scale the Kashmiri ones have. Because Balochistan does not lie along a disputed border between two hostile countries, it attracts minimal international interest. Human rights groups do criticise Islamabad, but they tend to give New Delhi more grief over Kashmir and the Northeast. At a time when Kashmir is in ferment again, it will be difficult for India to make a moral case over Balochistan.

Two, the Baloch insurgency is highly fragmented. India, has traditionally had a closer relationship with the Mendal and Marri tribal sardars, the Bugtis have been more willing to play footsie with Islamabad in the past. The Mendals formed the core of the Balochistan Liberation Army but this group has splintered and its leadership dispersed.

However, a new Baloch resistance has arisen in the southern parts of the province and includes middle class professionals rather than just tribal fighters. They would be more comfortable with urban sabotage than old-style rural ambushes. India would need to develop stronger ties with this new movement – though some of them express wariness about the Hindu nationalist tones of the Modi government. While not an insurmountable problem, it is an outreach that will take time.

Three, putting a light to Balochistan would be much easier for India if it could get a third party to become involved. At present, it is unclear there is such a candidate. Indian officials familiar with previous cases of India-Afghan cooperation, believe, Kabul may be prepared to turn a blind eye to India using their country as a logistics base to help the insurgent.

But central question is- are we also leaving Principal of non interference in the internal affairs of other country? What are the repercussions?

Having discussed the issues revolving around Indo Pak relations, let us recheck our perception of Pakistan and realty before we adopt any response.

6. India –Pakistan: Economic and social comparison

Our perception of Pakistan is- It is built on wrong premises (religion) and is a failed state. However, until a decade ago, Pakistan’s per capita income was superior to India’s, reflecting a lead consolidated over the preceding four decades. Post independence we embraced NAM- Non Alignment Movement and friendship with USSR, both failed concept in today’s uni-polar world. On the other hand Pakistan made friendship with west and enjoyed patronage and progressed fast.

Why this was so?

Pakistan had started on the back foot at its inception. After Partition, not only did India had the advantage of inheriting public institutions that had to be built from scratch in Pakistan, but India was left with a disproportionately larger share of the urban population, industry and transportation infrastructure. But it wasn’t all bad for Pakistan. What it lacked in state capacity and industry, it made up in the lion’s share of the fertile, irrigated land of Punjab. Important raw materials, such as cotton and jute, were also plentiful in both Punjab in West Pakistan and Bengal in East Pakistan.

Policymaking during the 1950s and ’60s was basically the same on both sides. The essential elements of central planning, state-led and foreign-aid-financed industrialization, and import substitution were espoused by the leaders in both Karachi and New Delhi. Soviet Russia was an inspiration for both. In fact, Pakistan started with the five-year planning system before India, but its first one collapsed in 1953 for lack of funds.

Meanwhile, India had stolen a march with a successful first five-year plan that surpassed its growth target and initiated large public infrastructure programmes. 

Amid Pakistan’s political chaos—army commander-in-chief Ayub Khan imposed military rule in October 1958. Whatever the political and institutional consequences of martial rule may have been, General Khan ushered in the golden period of the Pakistani economy. State capacity expanded, while the government invested heavily in infrastructure and heavy industry. Most importantly, an agricultural revolution was initiated—much before India was compelled to—and auxiliary industries to support a more industrialized agriculture came up in West Punjab. Pakistan was not only achieving self-sufficiency, but had also become home to a burgeoning export industry, especially in textiles. Islamabad was relaxing its licensing regime while Nehru was embarking on his leftward tilt.

Foreign aid played an important role in the economies of both countries at that time. A more market-friendly economic regime and picking the right horse in the Cold War worked well for Pakistan. This was perhaps the first time when the policy frameworks started diverging. By the middle of the 1960s, Indian socialism was being weighed against Pakistani pragmatism (as was Indian democracy with Chinese totalitarianism) and the latter was winning the race for foreign investment. The world’s celebration of Pakistani economic growth at that time was also driven by the fact that foreign advice was readily accepted and implemented. All you needed was the nod of the General. 

However, some two dozen families were said to own the whole country and the economic growth had failed to make a dent on social indicators. Yahya Khan’s failure to prevent the creation of Bangladesh not only overturned military rule but also Ayub Khan’s economic regime, replaced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populism.

Indira’s “garibi hatao” was matched by Bhutto’s “roti, kapda aur makan”. Redistribution and equity came to the forefront of policymaking and, once again, policy regimes in India and Pakistan converged. Within a year of becoming president, Bhutto nationalized the banking system, insurance companies and all major industries. Like Indira’s economic vandalism, Bhutto’s populism was destructive for Pakistan.

Both countries were engulfed in civil disorder by the middle of the decade. While India suffered the Emergency and eventually the Janata government, Pakistan got Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship and Bhutto’s death. Even before the Emergency, a rethink of the restrictive economic regime had started in India and some baby steps were taken during the Emergency to ease restrictions. The Janata government tinkered with it a little bit. Though, only in the 1980s,  did India finally start chipping away at its economic control and command regime. With Zia’s entry in 1977, Pakistan ended its affair with socialism at around the same time. Defence spending, American aid inflows (after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) and liberalization of industrial controls, among other things, helped revive and stabilize the economy.

At the expense of stating the obvious, this in no way mitigates Zia’s destructive legacy of religious fanaticism and terrorism the whole world is still living with. In fact, the sectarian violence, and the emergence of religious political parties that came with Zia’s politics, and the drug and Kalashnikov culture that came with Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan War, was the undoing of Pakistani society and its economic prosperity.

As in India, the economic liberalization of the 1980s in Pakistan was accompanied by large fiscal deficits. Pakistan was forced to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1988—two years before India had to approach the Fund in strikingly similar circumstances. What happened next led to the relative—and it’s only relative—prosperity of India and the stagnation of Pakistan. There was a clamour for deep and radical free-market reforms in both countries. Those were the years of the Washington Consensus. Both countries implemented some radical free-market reforms in 1991, though the process somewhat stalled in the following years. 

The arc of Indian economic policy and development over the last quarter-century is a familiar one and doesn’t need repetition. While India made some striking gains and eventually became the darling of the global investor community, Pakistan became a laggard. Why?

It can’t be just be the instability at the top. Between Zia’s death in 1988 and Pervez Musharraf’s October 1999 coup, Pakistan had nine different governments. Well, India had eight. What was different was how the political institutions and participants reacted to this instability. The conflicts of Mandir-Masjid-Mandal, divisive and violent as they surely were, seem to have been managed relatively calmly by Indian political institutions when one compares it with how the situation evolved across the border. Political rivals were not exiled, or jailed, or bumped off. Despite the occasional bloody riot, cities did not descend into a spiral of violence. Contrast that with Karachi. Fears of “target killings”, that very Karachi phrase, can be heard in hushed tones in drawing rooms even today. (The equanimity of Karachiites, having internalized the violence, can be unnerving to outsiders, even to fellow Pakistanis.)

Chaos begets chaos, which begets dictatorship. The sociopolitical chaos of the 1980s and the ’90s led to chaotic and fitful policymaking and economic slowdown. While the Pakistani economy grew by an average of about 7% during the 1980s, the rate was down to just below 4% in the ’90s—per capita income even contracted during a couple of years. Amid the chaos rose another dictator.

For all his sins, and there are many, Musharraf is probably the most liberal leader Pakistan has ever had—both economically and socially. Following an orthodox economic programme, the economy crept out of the 1990s rut and grew by an average of more than 5% before the great financial crisis struck and Musharraf was toppled. Society was also opened up.

Since the revival of democracy, governance has been patchy and the economy is now recovering from a crisis. The country was reclassified as an emerging market by the MSCI earlier this year and it successfully completed the final IMF review of a three-year assistance programme in August. Growth prospects look rosier, though reforms seem to have slowed down.

Meanwhile, India has tasted economic success and overtaken Pakistan on most indicators. In 1990, the per capita income (using 2011 constant prices) in India was 1,773 PPP US dollars, just 58% of Pakistan’s. It took India two whole decades to catch up and now we have lead of 20%. 

But these figures hide the heterogeneity in income levels within the country, and India continues to have a much higher percentage of its population living under poverty. The contrast is starker when it comes to incidence of absolute poverty, and India has a lot of ground to cover.

Moreover, the different outcomes for the two neighbours makes it clear that the quality of Indian institutions and their ability to bend but not break under the weight of social divisions and instability have had a much more decisive role in determining our fortunes.

7. Pakistan’s Version- Stand.

There are various positions taken by Pakistan.

a.     We support Kashmir Liberation struggle.

b.      "Give us more evidence."

c.     We distinguish between “good terror and bad terror”

d.     We ourselves are victims of Terrorism.

e.     India also encourages Hindu terrorism.

f.      India herself stages different attacks on itself to defame Pakistan and divert attention of world and its own people from real issues at hand.

g.     All this is done/ being done to wage war against us.

h.     Nothing like surgical strike happened.

It is in denial mode with regard to its involvement in terror attacks and also India’s counter measure –Militarily (Surgical Strike) and diplomatically (isolation). 

As citizen of India, I believe Pakistan posture is wrong, but I also believe that any state is capable of doing what Pakistan is alleging of India doing. Latest example is of USA who under Bush Administration coined the theory of possession of “Weapons of Mass Destruction” by Iraq to wage war against Iraq. The same was proved to be false at later stage, but has given rise to present crisis in West Asia.  

There is also point in Pakistan’s version, how is it possible to penetrate high security military installations (Pathankot and Uri)? If it is true that outsiders came and attacked, we should be worried about our army’s security alertness.

8. Pakistani Move/ Response/ Position.

Pakistan is repositioning itself as follows:

a. As India is tilting toward USA, Pakistan plans "China-Russia-Iran" axis.

b. It says, Afghanistan solution subject to resolution of the Kashmir issue, implicitly warning that Pakistan can undermine US and Indian efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

c. Nuclear threat.

d. If India continue to refer Balochistan, Pakistan would respond by "talking of Khalistan, Nagaland, Tripura, Assam, Sikkim or the Maoist insurgency."

e. Pakistan's strategic value in Asian geopolitics has rendered isolation largely unrealistic. Pakistan remains one of the few countries in the world with strategic ties to almost all major powers, from the United States to Russia and China. Despite recent cuts in aid owing to fallouts over counterterrorism, the US still spends as much as $320 million in security aid alone to Islamabad.

f. And any attempts to isolate Pakistan globally will drive China to be more hawkish and protective in Pakistan's defence. Beijing has already invested heavily on an infrastructure project connecting its Western provinces to Pakistan's southern coastline - and most pointedly, a significant part of it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. And last year, China voted against India's appeals at the UN to censure Pakistan. China’s position do not take political advantage of terror issue. This really is an "all-weather" alliance.

g. Pakistan is member of Islamic World- A group of almost 40 countries.

Modi Govt. Blow Hot Blow Cold.- Isolating Pakistan.

9. Our Policy alternatives.

Critics charge that the Indian government has been found alarmingly short of answers in tackling Islamabad, even as terrorists from across the border perpetrate one attack after the other. The criticism isn't invalid. The government has blown hot and cold in equal measure on Pakistan, suggesting a lack of coherence within India's foreign policy establishment. New Delhi's stated policy has been to suspend all dialogue with Pakistan, until Islamabad cracks down on terror camps on its soil. Yet, talks have happened, and with no abatement in terrorism.

Let's face it: India has no bargaining chips at present to counter Pakistan with. The best form of "isolation" India can manage is to impose economic sanctions on Pakistan. But its impact is likely to be weak. In 2014, India's trade with Pakistan amounted to under $2.5 billion; by contrast, China traded almost $13 billion worth of goods with Pakistan that year. India's trade with Pakistan makes up less than five per cent of Pakistan's total trade.

New Delhi has to develop pressure points vis-à-vis Islamabad if it is to frame a coherent and purposeful response and actually take "action" against terror groups in the region. That means making hard choices. Take the Pakistan military, for instance - an institution notorious for its widely publicized patronage of militant groups targeting India, but also an unlikely starting point. 

Pakistan’s Military personnel –serving and retired- control industry and commerce. Yet, India's self-imposed freeze on dialogue with the Pakistani army means that none of those businesses have a stake in India. Thus unless they see normalization with India profitable (economically), we will not succeed).If Pakistan army officers had deep private economic interests in India, the Pakistan army would likely be less comfortable with terrorism across the border.

I believe that India must first recognize that the Pakistan Army has the final say in any policy pertaining to India and J&K. This is because the (presently) Pakistan Army has strategic reasons to keep the fires burning between our two countries.

Additionally, we should engage with Pakistan's civil society to root out political propaganda directed against India across the border. Much of Islamabad's policy towards India is sustained on a web of ideological poison, portraying New Delhi as an existential threat to Pakistan (gained much currency after Bangladesh creation). The propaganda has effectively made the peace process prohibitively costly for political leaders across Pakistan's spectrum.

Another larger question is whether international pressure will induce Pakistan to stop abetting, aiding, training, providing weapons and financing terrorist groups. Answer, may not be. No other country or group of countries would come forth in our support. How do we propose to have the major powers (read US and allies) declare Pakistan a terrorist sponsor state and impose sanctions? Harbouring of Osama in Pakistan, did not force the US to declare them a sponsor of state terror or to have any sanctions imposed.Thus, we would have to deal with Pakistan directly.

India should also convince US, Canada, UK, China, and Columbia to withdraw UN Resolution 47 of 1948 which calls for a "free and impartial plebiscite" in Kashmir. Even if China feels otherwise the others sponsors can informally announce their position. This one act would deny Pakistan their so-called right to support perceived freedom movement in Kashmir. Similarly, Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail must be exposed.

Internally,the best option against cross-border strike is to protect ourselves. Striking at will against our military installations must be prevented.

It is also necessary to find solutions to internal issues. Whatever it takes, it is most essential to have the population having complete allegiance to the Union of India, whether it is J&K, NE or Naxal areas. There cannot be a military solution, the population in these insurgency-prone areas must genuinely believe in the "idea of India". This is only possible through constructive dialogue with all the stakeholders.

Lastly, India must use its economic strength to maintain substantial conventional military superiority. The defense budget must be stepped up to the three per cent of GDP to ensure this superiority. However, military superiority alone is not enough and political will to use it is imperative.

To conclude, military diplomatic, political and economic assault must continue parallely. Indus water, MFN, isolation internationally and regionally, must be pursued vigorously, to ensure that they feel the pain of being an international pariah.

9.  Conclusion: Human Sufferings and Economic cost.

Considering the issues and both side’s position, what can be done?

Even as many participants in the nightly television discussion shows seem to welcome the prospect of war, the fact remains that conflict is damaging for both countries – politically and economically. (Remember our economic hardship post Bangladesh war).

Scarcely do they (war mongers) feel the pain and suffering of the people, most of whom are poor, living close to the borders on both sides. Ever since the surgical strikes and the unnecessary hype from metropolitan media studios, lakhs of people have been uprooted overnight to locations where they are not entirely welcome and have to rely on the charity of local communities. It is distressing to witness in this harvest season poor people carrying away their small belongings on bullock-driven carts to uncertain places. These scenes so ubiquitous these days on media force a painful recollection of the days of Partition. So the actual question which ought to be asked is whether the two countries should go to war or not?

Further, according to an analysis done by the Mumbai-based think-tank Strategic Foresight Group in 2004, the India-Pakistan conflict already squeezes out 3% of India’s economic potential,. In a report titled "Cost of Conflict", the group analyzed military expenditures of the two countries to conclude that even low-intensity warfare could have “financial costs, [hurt] human lives and policy losses". Similarly, 3,843 Indian soldiers and close to 8,000 Pakistani soldiers died during the direct military confrontation between the two countries in 1971, which ended with the capture of more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war.

The report sought to chart the impact of relatively mild confrontations along the border and their resulting costs. For instance, after the attack on Parliament in 2001. India spent $600 million between December 2001 and January 2002 and Pakistan spent another $400 million. Estimates by the Strategic Foresight Group suggest the two countries ended up spending more than $3 billion in the short period of time due to confrontation and the overarching possibility of a nuclear war.

While the group noted that a defense budget cut could release 1% of GDP for India and nearly 2.5% for Pakistan, it added that Pakistan spends a humongous sum of money just dealing with international conflicts and internal terror. Pakistan spent Rs 424 billion in visible and invisible payments to terror outfits and its own military in the year 2004, which was about 10.6% of its GDP then, according to estimates by the think-tank.

Meanwhile, the global costs of a potential nuclear war between India and Pakistan could prove immensely high. More than 21 million people would be killed, half the ozone layer destroyed and a “nuclear winter” could affect rains and agriculture across the globe, an analysis by India Spend noted.

The Federation of Indian Chambers for Commerce and Industry estimated in a report that there is a huge business cost to the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan as the trade by value remains small and pales in comparison with trade between India and neighbors such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka due to continued tensions.

Gopal Krishna Gandhi pointed out the futility of the past wars between the two countries which have reinforced the image of each other as congenital enemies. From 1947 to 1999 what have the two countries gained except for feeding triumphalist egos, and dreaming of imaginary victories? The loss on either side has been more or less same. Bangladesh did come into existence but it has sown fierce enmity in the military mind of the other country.

If a new war breaks out no one knows which direction it will go. But for sure the result of this war will go beyond rhetoric and vain triumphalism of the two nations. However, no amount of joy or pleasure drawn from victories, concrete or abstract, can match the tears of people whose dear ones have fed the roaring war machinery. A war to end war is only wishful thinking, for wars have only produced war chains; it is only through peace and dialogues that anxiety and anguish can be vanquished and greater spiritual victories accomplished.

 Even if a country is victorious in a war, the agreements forced on the defeated party become sources of trouble and mayhem in the future.( 1971 victory sown seed of Punjab and Kashmir unrest and Kargil war) The WWII was a result of the humiliation heaped on Germany and her allies. The War-born agreements are scarcely acceptable to future generations.

How often have we heard that Shimla Agreement has few owners in Pakistan because the signatures, according to them, were taken from people who had no other option after losing on the battle field. Or even the Instrument in Accession in Kashmir, a document which emerged from a war scene. Fewer documents in modern history are as controversial and disputed as the IoA, one of the reasons being that its genesis is war, the latter in more refined language termed as “special circumstances.”For the overall winning Party it is an article of faith but for the defeated it is nothing but a piece of paper representing deceit.

On the contrary, the truce born of relatively equivalent grounds is more prospective and bears the seeds of long lasting fruit. To begin work on such peace, the primary duty should be to in the starve the war horses media.

Let us be strong. Let us be considerate.