In the aftermath of “Surgical Strike” by India, let us try
to understand the background and emerging scenario. We will try to understand
it in terms of- History of Partition, Shimla Agreement,
SAARC, Indus Water Treaty, MFN, Balochistan- all the words and issues
that dominated the discourse for last whole month. We will also try to
understand economic and geopolitical situation of
Pakistan as against India for correct response. Last but not the least, human suffering and the economic cost due to sour relation/ war for both the countries
will be discussed.
1. History of Partition till date.
The bitterness
and greed that marked the Partition is yet to be forgotten. The partition was
mainly based on religious line and continuity of land area. But there was a
problem with the state of Junagadh; with a Muslim ruler, it was
contiguous to West Pakistan but its population was largely Hindu. Similarly,
the Maharaja of Kashmir was a Hindu, but the majority population was largely
Muslim. So following the Junagadh example (which was
taken over by India), Pakistan made a strong case for Kashmir. Thus the fate of
Kashmir was a major contest between the newly formed Pakistan and a truncated
India.
What happened
next was that the Jawaharlal Nehru government sent a plebiscite resolution (
Janmat Sangrah -to determine what public wants) to the UN. Then, the Maharaja
signed an instrument of accession in favour of India. The outstanding and
unrivalled leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah was convinced by Nehru
that he would work in the interests of the Kashmiris and self-rule. Nehru's
successors like his redoubtable daughter Indira Gandhi made no attempt to fulfill
the promises to Sheikh Abdullah. In the UN, resolutions put on the table were
clearly not acceptable to one side or another. Eventually, the UN threw up its
hands. Thus Pakistan has an enduring grouse: what about
the plebiscite? India argues that successive elections have proved majority
support.
Two countries also
fought wars, last full-fledged one being 1971, which saw emergence of Bangla
Desh. Post war PM Indira Gandhi offered the Pakistani leadership the Shimla
Accord, which the Pakistanis reinterpreted as suited them.
Virtually the
whole world and certainly the great powers are fully aware that this is a very
knotty problem. Pakistan has decided to do a Bangladesh
on India. The terrorist attacks on India are meant to bleed India, as
India allegedly did in East Pakistan/ Bangladesh. Since the positions of both
sides are embedded in their nationalism, and both are nuclear weapons states,
the situation is grim.
2. Shimla
Agreement and dumping of it.
While
Shimla Agreement was historic in the sense that it barred third party mediation
in both country’s outstanding disputes (technically making UN resolution
obsolete), it
seems Modi Govt. is now giving shape to new aggressive policies that will put
our relations with Pakistan not in spirit/ bound by 45 year old agreement. It
is this angel that makes “Surgical Strike” so important. Importance of strike
lies in its significance and not in its detail. The substance, strategic issue
is: India made the public statement it did. This redefines the India-Pakistan
relationship here on. It also firmly signals the end of continuity from Indian
side. This is Modi saying “History begins here and
Now”.
Historically, since
trouble returned to the Valley in 1989, and terror made its first appearance in
mainland India with the Bombay serial blasts of 1993, certain postulates have
evolved over time to define India’s response. One, not
to “internationalize” the “bilateral” Kashmir problem (as per Shimla Agreement). Linked to this is
second principle ( as per Shimla Agreement) renaming the old ceasefire
line(CFL) as Line of Controll (LOC) conferred on it the status of a defacto
border affirming the division of Kashmir
along it which the two countries were to formalize at a more opportunate time Both side
respected it until 1989 and India till surgical strike. Till date all later peace
proposals were centered on it. This is over now. As, Pakistan
was taking things granted as per Shimla Agreement and was trying to get more, now
India has decided to reciprocate.
3. SAARC
SAARC stands for South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation. Post Uri we all begin to wonder
whether SAARC is considered an instrument for regional cooperation or regional
instability. It is perhaps appropriate to recall that a Sri Lanka writer,
considering the regional squabbles in South Asia at the time of the first SAARC
summit in 1987 wrote: Let’s not be Saarcastic.
The organization was
formed 31 years ago with hope to uplift millions, but it never did really take
off the ground. India the
biggest of the seven nations was at the geographical centre and it was at the
centre of most of the controversies. By the time SAARC was formed
Indo-Lanka relations were simmering (with Sri Lanka alleging, India sponsoring
cross-border terrorism to Sri Lanka with separatist Tamil terrorist camps being
established in Tamil Nadu). When the Sri Lanka government launched a military
operation to drive out the LTTE camps from Jaffna, India declared that it would
not tolerate the Sri Lankan forces capturing Jaffna town which finally resulted
in an Indian Peace Keeping Force landing in Sri Lanka. Pakistan
however continued to assist Sri Lanka with armaments throughout the 30-year
war.
It will be recalled that during the
intervention of India in East Pakistan to create a separate state Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka permitted Pakistani military officials to pass through Colombo from
West to East Pakistan. That friendship created in 1971
held during Sri Lanka’s 30-year terrorist war and continues today.
A strategy to punish Pakistan
diplomatically for its alleged attacks was to isolate it diplomatically. In
this attempt the India attempted to frog march SAARC members to the Indian side
and one country targeted was Sri Lanka. But not succeeded so far. Sri Lanka
pointed out that under the SARRC Convention the moment that one country says it
is not able to attend a SAARC Summit, it cannot be held and so no question of
pulling out in support of India.
Rationally speaking, for India to destroy a South Asian
Summit for Regional Cooperation with the objective of punishing its arch foe
Pakistan that was hosting the summit makes no sense. Pakistan
is hosting the Summit on a rotational basis among member states and has no
proprietarily claims over the SAARC summit. Those who went by India’s
decision may be small but they also know geo-politics. Barring Afghanistan,
their borders touch India’s borders, not Pakistan’s.
Herein lies the bane of Saarc. It is
so much overshadowed by the India-Pakistan encounter that it has become nothing
but a failed experiment. Thus
Saarc Summit meeting which is supposed to be an annual affair is still debating
its 19th (Eight time cancelled, due to bilateral issues), which
ideally should have been its 31st. Yet, strangely, the Saarc
constitution prohibits any discussion on bilateral matters.
As
Kashmir dispute lingered, the infrastructural link-up needed for regional
connectivity suffered.
And without a viable infrastructural link-up providing facilities for transit
across the length and breadth of region, the trade within the region and beyond
it to market regional produce did not materialize. No wonder that intra-regional trade is as little
as 4.6% of the region’s total international trade. Here is some comparison: it is 40% in North American Free
Trade Agreement, 26% in Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and 67% in
European Union. Further, the region accounts for about 25% of the world’s
population but contributes barely 2.5% to the global trade, that too primarily
because of India.
All this has brought SAARC to a
critical point. Can it go on without India?
India perhaps did not want SAARC from its inception when the support it
extended to SAARC is considered. Has India always been and still is Saarcastic
about SAARC? Reality is, the two principal members of
Saarc, India and Pakistan have other ambitions. It is generally the view in
India that for the failure of Saarc, Pakistan is responsible. The fact is that
India is equally responsible. India has found/developed the substitute of Saarc
in sub-regional and sub-regional plus cooperation (less Pakistan) looking eastward
and Pakistan has found the same by looking extra regionally westward and also
towards China in a big way.
Here Two
factors matter the most ( for failure/success), one, India’s unprecedented rise
yet not enough to impress its neighbours that much, and two, the shadow of China which provides a constant source
of anxiety to India but which is a positive factor for the rest of the region. (Observe
oscillation of Nepal and Srilanka, between India and China). Islamabad had also
tried to push China’s membership, much to India’s discomfort.
The bottom-line is that the sooner the 19th Summit is held,
the better. It should not be anybody’s case that the present stand-off between
India and Pakistan should be allowed to linger indefinitely, for it is pregnant
with dangerous possibilities. There is no other organization than Saarc that is
particularly suited to facilitate this process, its general failure
notwithstanding.
3. Indus Waters
Treaty
In light of
media reports of reviewing/ revoking the treaty, it should be understood that
there are procedural limitations (there is no exit clause in it and according the
sub-provisions (3) and (4) of the Article XII of the IWT, the Treaty cannot be
altered or revoked unilaterally) of India unilaterally taking up
any water development projects on these rivers in the absence of Pakistan’s
consent. Under the provisions of the treaty, Pakistan can complain about any
Indian project upstream and the World Bank has the power to appoint a “neutral
expert” to decide. Even if India’s projects upstream are within the provisions
of the treaty, as was the case in the Baglihar hydropower project, Pakistan can
delay India’s plans for a long time if it decides to. Also
Pakistan’s all weather friend China, by putting hurdles in the flow of
Brahmaputra River can create problem for us.
We should
remember that much before the Uri attacks, water sharing in the Indus basin had
become a major political predicament in the face of increasing water demand and
climate change-related uncertainties.
Indus Waters Treaty has stood the test of time for the last 56 years,
but the deep mistrust between India and Pakistan has thwarted the
implementation of a number of seemingly advantageous water development projects
in the basin.
Though
the treaty is over river waters, it is designed primarily to split the river
system in two, not to encourage cooperative sharing of its waters. The Indus Waters Treaty, in facilitating the partition
of the river system between the two countries, has in fact contributed to
reducing the scope of engagement between them. The treaty is not a marriage of
two consenting adults to lead a life together, but has turned out to be a
mutually agreed divorce settlement. Though the best possible use of Indus
waters needs both the major riparian countries to work together for the
development of water infrastructure, the treaty, unfortunately, does not
encourage any incentive towards joint basin management.
The frequent
fight over the interpretation of the treaty has also raised serious doubts over
any peace dividend coming out of it for the two countries. Moreover, conflict
over water sharing is not limited at the bilateral level between India and Pakistan only but within countries also.
The Indian
states of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan continue to fight over their rightful
share of the waters of the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej). The same is
the case among the provinces of Pakistan, who regularly quarrels with one
another over the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab. Even Kashmiris believe
that the state of Jammu and Kashmir has the potential to produce 20,000 MW of
hydropower, enough to make the state energy self-reliant.
To solve problem,
for over 10 years, the World Bank has been promoting a negotiation process,
called the Abu Dhabi Dialogue, among the
countries in the Indus and Ganges-Brahmaputra basin to explore ways for
basin-based cooperation on shared river systems. When this process started in
2006 in Abu Dhabi, it is argued that the Indus Waters Treaty has outlived its
utility and both India and Pakistan should work towards revising it. They also
need to bring two other riparian countries of the basin, Afghanistan and China,
to the ambit of the new treaty.
For
appropriate and competent management of Indus systems, it is necessary to
explore establishing an effective and independent river
basin organization, involving all the four riparian states, which will
have the capability of taking decisions on its own and remain out of the
political control of any national government. Under an integrated programme of
basin development, water projects can be situated at optimum locations,
notwithstanding geographic divisions along political lines.
Thus,
instead of the urge to take revenge against Pakistan, if India takes the
opportunity to work for a comprehensive and integrated form of basin
management, the benefit sharing of the Indus river system will not be limited
only to water resources; it can have
other peace-enhancing effects and significantly contribute to regional peace,
security and development. If our government is really serious about making
better use of the Indus waters, the formed ministerial panel should explore the
possibility of how to make the treaty wider and better to meet the increasing
water and energy needs of the region.
4. MFN- Most Favoured Nation.
In
light of Uri attack, there is demand that India withdrew MFN satutus to Pakistan.
But first understand MFN, then our options and consequences of our decision.
What
is Most Favoured Nation status?
According
to the MFN principle of the WTO’s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
— to which India is a signatory/contracting party — each of the WTO member countries
should “treat all the other members equally as
‘most-favored’ trading partners.”
The
WTO says, "Grant someone a special favor (such as a lower customs duty
rate) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members." Hence,
though MFN sounds like special treatment, in effect it means
non-discrimination.
Have
Pakistan and India accorded MFN status to each other?
The
MFN status was accorded to Pakistan in 1996 as per India’s commitments as a WTO
member. But Pakistan has not reciprocated, reportedly citing “non-tariff
barriers” erected by India as well as huge trade imbalance. According to the
WTO’s report on the Trade Policy Review of Pakistan (in 2015), “Pakistan is in
the process of offering India Non-Discriminatory Market Access" (similar
to MFN).
What
will happen if India revokes Pakistan's MFN status?
If
India chooses to do so there won’t be any significant trade fallout as the
level of bilateral trade is “very low” — representing a minuscule 0.4 per cent
of India’s overall goods trade worth $643.3 billion in 2015-16.
What
will be the political fallout of such an action by India?
Though
it will have only a “symbolic” impact in trade terms, politically it could
result in India losing goodwill in the South Asian region, where it enjoys a
trade surplus and is a party to a free trade pact called SAFTA, which also
includes Pakistan. The move may also not go down well at the WTO-level.
What
are India’s options?
India could consider making use of a ‘security exception’ clause --
Article 21(b)(iii) -- in the GATT to deny the MFN status to Pakistan or bring
in certain trade restrictions.
What
should Indian officials keep in mind while considering using the Article 21
provision?
According
to a paper by Shailja Singh of the Centre for WTO Studies at the Indian
Institute of Foreign Trade, “GATT and WTO practice shows that the countries
have by and large observed self restraint in using the national security
exception.
One
of the strategy that India is openly pursuing now ( like acknowledging surgical
strike), is support to “Balochis” for their struggle against Pakistan as a counterweight
for Pakistan support to Kashmir.
Thus, India plans to provide an Indian home for Baloch nationalist leader Brahamdagh Bugti. But providing Bugti a
place to set up a “government-in-exile” or its equivalent is the easy part.
Next is hard one. The mixed history of India’s involvement with Balochistan is
a reminder that this is an extremely difficult ploy to use successfully. The
record, however, does seem to indicate that civil society gambits like Bugti as
opposed to supplying weapons to insurgents may be the most effective means to
put this thorn back into Pakistan’s side.
History.
Balochistan is in the throes of its fifth insurgency
since being taken over by Pakistan. Most have lasted only one or two years.
When they have been longer it is often because they secured external backing. Russian
and Iraqi support ensured the 1973 insurgency lasted four years. The last round
began in 2004 and went on until 2012. Pakistani military sources, speaking
privately, name the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul and, through him, New
Delhi as the foreign hands of this period.
Since 2014 the Baloch insurgency has become a low key
affair. The Pakistani security forces have gotten on top of the Baloch who are
now low on funds, arms and facing extreme repression. Thus, direct Indian
support to the Baloch insurgents would not be impossible and revive a
relationship wound down or redirected through third governments after the
1980s.
But there are a number of things to keep in mind.
One, it will be more difficult for India to
make Balochistan a matter of international concern for Pakistan than it will be
for Islamabad to do the same with Kashmir
for New Delhi. Baloch insurgencies never achieved the sort of scale the
Kashmiri ones have. Because Balochistan does not lie along a disputed border
between two hostile countries, it attracts minimal international interest.
Human rights groups do criticise Islamabad, but they tend to give New Delhi
more grief over Kashmir and the Northeast. At a time when Kashmir is in ferment
again, it will be difficult for India to make a moral case over Balochistan.
Two, the Baloch insurgency is highly
fragmented. India, has traditionally had
a closer relationship with the Mendal and Marri tribal sardars, the Bugtis have
been more willing to play footsie with Islamabad in the past. The Mendals
formed the core of the Balochistan Liberation Army but this group has
splintered and its leadership dispersed.
However, a new Baloch resistance has arisen in the
southern parts of the province and includes middle class professionals rather
than just tribal fighters. They would be more comfortable with urban sabotage
than old-style rural ambushes. India would need to develop stronger ties with
this new movement – though some of them express wariness about the Hindu
nationalist tones of the Modi government. While not an insurmountable problem,
it is an outreach that will take time.
Three, putting a light to Balochistan would
be much easier for India if it could get a third party to become involved. At present, it is unclear there is such a candidate.
Indian officials familiar with previous cases of India-Afghan cooperation, believe,
Kabul may be prepared to turn a blind eye to India using their country as a
logistics base to help the insurgent.
But central question is- are we also leaving
Principal of non interference in the internal affairs of other country? What
are the repercussions?
Having discussed the issues revolving around Indo
Pak relations, let us recheck our perception of Pakistan and realty before we
adopt any response.
6. India –Pakistan: Economic and social comparison
Our perception of Pakistan is- It is built on
wrong premises (religion) and is a failed state.
However, until a decade ago, Pakistan’s per capita
income was superior to India’s, reflecting a lead consolidated over the
preceding four decades. Post independence we embraced
NAM- Non Alignment Movement and friendship with USSR, both failed concept in
today’s uni-polar world. On the other hand Pakistan made friendship with west
and enjoyed patronage and progressed fast.
Why this was so?
Pakistan had started on the back foot at its inception.
After Partition, not only did India had the advantage of inheriting public
institutions that had to be built from scratch in Pakistan, but India was left
with a disproportionately larger share of the urban population, industry and
transportation infrastructure. But it wasn’t all bad for Pakistan. What it
lacked in state capacity and industry, it made up in the lion’s share of the
fertile, irrigated land of Punjab. Important raw materials, such as cotton and
jute, were also plentiful in both Punjab in West Pakistan and Bengal in East
Pakistan.
Policymaking during the 1950s and ’60s was
basically the same on both sides.
The essential elements of central planning, state-led
and foreign-aid-financed industrialization, and import substitution were
espoused by the leaders in both Karachi and New Delhi. Soviet Russia was
an inspiration for both. In fact, Pakistan started with the five-year planning
system before India, but its first one collapsed in 1953 for lack of funds.
Meanwhile, India had stolen a march with a successful first
five-year plan that surpassed its growth target and initiated large public
infrastructure programmes.
Amid Pakistan’s political chaos—army commander-in-chief Ayub
Khan imposed military rule in October 1958. Whatever the political and
institutional consequences of martial rule may have been, General Khan ushered in the golden period of the Pakistani
economy. State capacity expanded, while the government invested heavily
in infrastructure and heavy industry. Most importantly, an agricultural
revolution was initiated—much before India was compelled to—and auxiliary
industries to support a more industrialized agriculture came up in West Punjab. Pakistan
was not only achieving self-sufficiency, but had also become home to a
burgeoning export industry, especially in textiles. Islamabad was relaxing its
licensing regime while Nehru was embarking on his leftward tilt.
Foreign aid played an important role in the
economies of both countries at that time. A more market-friendly economic
regime and picking the right horse in the Cold War worked well for Pakistan. This was perhaps the first time when the policy frameworks
started diverging. By the middle of the 1960s, Indian socialism was being
weighed against Pakistani pragmatism (as was Indian democracy with Chinese
totalitarianism) and the latter was winning the race for foreign investment. The
world’s celebration of Pakistani economic growth at that time was also driven
by the fact that foreign advice was readily accepted and implemented. All you
needed was the nod of the General.
However, some two dozen families were said to own
the whole country and the economic growth had failed to make a dent on social
indicators. Yahya Khan’s failure to prevent the
creation of Bangladesh not only overturned military rule but also Ayub Khan’s
economic regime, replaced by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s populism.
Indira’s “garibi hatao” was matched by
Bhutto’s “roti, kapda aur makan”. Redistribution
and equity came to the forefront of policymaking and, once again, policy
regimes in India and Pakistan converged. Within a year of becoming president,
Bhutto nationalized the banking system, insurance companies and all major
industries. Like Indira’s economic vandalism, Bhutto’s populism was destructive
for Pakistan.
Both countries were engulfed in civil disorder by
the middle of the decade. While India suffered the Emergency and eventually the
Janata government, Pakistan got Zia-ul-Haq’s dictatorship and Bhutto’s death. Even before the Emergency, a rethink of the restrictive
economic regime had started in India and some baby steps were taken during the
Emergency to ease restrictions. The Janata government tinkered with it a little
bit. Though, only in the 1980s, did
India finally start chipping away at its economic control and command regime. With
Zia’s entry in 1977, Pakistan ended its affair with socialism at around the
same time. Defence spending, American aid inflows (after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan) and liberalization of industrial controls, among other things,
helped revive and stabilize the economy.
At the expense of stating the obvious, this in no way
mitigates Zia’s destructive legacy of religious fanaticism and terrorism the
whole world is still living with. In fact, the sectarian violence, and the
emergence of religious political parties that came with Zia’s politics, and the
drug and Kalashnikov culture that came with Pakistan’s involvement in the
Afghan War, was the undoing of Pakistani society and its economic prosperity.
As in India, the economic liberalization of the 1980s in
Pakistan was accompanied by large fiscal deficits. Pakistan was forced to go to
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1988—two years before India had to
approach the Fund in strikingly similar circumstances. What happened next led
to the relative—and it’s only relative—prosperity of India and the stagnation
of Pakistan. There was a clamour for deep and radical free-market reforms in
both countries. Those were the years of the Washington Consensus. Both countries implemented some radical free-market reforms
in 1991, though the process somewhat stalled in the following years.
The arc of Indian economic policy and development
over the last quarter-century is a familiar one and doesn’t need repetition.
While India made some striking gains and eventually became the darling of the
global investor community, Pakistan became a laggard. Why?
It can’t be just be the instability at the top. Between
Zia’s death in 1988 and Pervez Musharraf’s October 1999 coup, Pakistan had nine
different governments. Well, India had eight. What was different
was how the political institutions and participants reacted to this
instability. The conflicts of Mandir-Masjid-Mandal, divisive and
violent as they surely were, seem to have been managed relatively calmly by
Indian political institutions when one compares it with how the situation
evolved across the border. Political rivals were not exiled, or jailed, or
bumped off. Despite the occasional bloody riot, cities did not descend into a
spiral of violence. Contrast that with Karachi. Fears of “target killings”,
that very Karachi phrase, can be heard in hushed tones in drawing rooms even
today. (The equanimity of Karachiites, having internalized the violence, can be
unnerving to outsiders, even to fellow Pakistanis.)
Chaos begets chaos, which begets dictatorship. The
sociopolitical chaos of the 1980s and the ’90s led to chaotic and fitful
policymaking and economic slowdown. While the Pakistani economy grew by an
average of about 7% during the 1980s, the rate was down to just below 4% in the
’90s—per capita income even contracted during a couple of years. Amid the chaos
rose another dictator.
For all his sins, and there are many, Musharraf is probably the most liberal leader Pakistan has
ever had—both economically and socially. Following an orthodox economic
programme, the economy crept out of the 1990s rut and grew by an average of
more than 5% before the great financial crisis struck and Musharraf was
toppled. Society was also opened up.
Since the revival of democracy, governance has been patchy
and the economy is now recovering from a crisis. The country was reclassified
as an emerging market by the MSCI earlier this year and it successfully
completed the final IMF review of a three-year assistance programme in August.
Growth prospects look rosier, though reforms seem to have slowed down.
Meanwhile, India has tasted economic success and overtaken
Pakistan on most indicators. In 1990, the per capita
income (using 2011 constant prices) in India was 1,773 PPP US dollars, just 58%
of Pakistan’s. It took India two whole decades to catch up and now we have lead
of 20%.
But these figures hide the heterogeneity in income levels
within the country, and India continues to have a much
higher percentage of its population living under poverty. The contrast is
starker when it comes to incidence of absolute poverty, and India has a lot of
ground to cover.
Moreover, the different outcomes for the two neighbours
makes it clear that the quality of Indian institutions
and their ability to bend but not break under the weight of social divisions
and instability have had a much more decisive role in determining our fortunes.
7. Pakistan’s Version- Stand.
There are various positions taken by
Pakistan.
a. We support Kashmir Liberation struggle.
b.
"Give us more evidence."
c.
We distinguish between “good terror
and bad terror”
d.
We ourselves are victims of
Terrorism.
e.
India also encourages Hindu
terrorism.
f.
India herself stages
different attacks on itself to defame Pakistan and divert attention of world
and its own people from real issues at hand.
g.
All this is done/ being done to wage
war against us.
h.
Nothing like surgical
strike happened.
It is in denial mode with regard to its involvement in terror
attacks and also India’s counter measure –Militarily (Surgical Strike) and
diplomatically (isolation).
As citizen of India, I
believe Pakistan posture is wrong, but I also believe that any state is capable
of doing what Pakistan is alleging of India doing. Latest example is of USA who
under Bush Administration coined the theory of possession of “Weapons of Mass
Destruction” by Iraq to wage war against Iraq. The same was proved to be false
at later stage, but has given rise to present crisis in West Asia.
There is also point in Pakistan’s version, how is it possible to
penetrate high security military installations (Pathankot and Uri)? If it is
true that outsiders came and attacked, we should be worried about our army’s
security alertness.
8. Pakistani Move/ Response/
Position.
Pakistan is repositioning itself as
follows:
a. As India is tilting toward USA, Pakistan plans "China-Russia-Iran" axis.
b.
It says, Afghanistan solution subject to
resolution of the Kashmir issue, implicitly warning that Pakistan can undermine US
and Indian efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
c.
Nuclear threat.
d.
If India continue to refer Balochistan, Pakistan would respond by "talking of Khalistan, Nagaland, Tripura, Assam, Sikkim
or the Maoist insurgency."
e. Pakistan's
strategic value in Asian geopolitics has rendered isolation largely
unrealistic. Pakistan remains one of the few countries
in the world with strategic ties to almost all major powers, from the United
States to Russia and China. Despite recent cuts in aid owing to fallouts
over counterterrorism, the US still spends as much as $320 million in security
aid alone to Islamabad.
f. And any
attempts to isolate Pakistan globally will drive China
to be more hawkish and protective in Pakistan's defence. Beijing has
already invested heavily on an infrastructure project connecting its Western
provinces to Pakistan's southern coastline - and most pointedly, a significant
part of it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. And last year, China voted
against India's appeals at the UN to censure Pakistan. China’s position do not
take political advantage of terror issue. This really is an
"all-weather" alliance.
g. Pakistan is
member of Islamic World- A group of almost 40 countries.
Modi Govt. Blow Hot Blow Cold.- Isolating Pakistan.
9. Our Policy alternatives.
Critics charge
that the Indian government has been found alarmingly short of answers in
tackling Islamabad, even as terrorists from across the border perpetrate one
attack after the other. The criticism isn't invalid. The
government has blown hot and cold in equal measure on Pakistan,
suggesting a lack of coherence within India's foreign policy establishment. New
Delhi's stated policy has been to suspend all dialogue with Pakistan, until
Islamabad cracks down on terror camps on its soil. Yet, talks have happened,
and with no abatement in terrorism.
Let's face it:
India has no bargaining chips at present to counter
Pakistan with. The best form of "isolation" India can manage
is to impose economic sanctions on Pakistan. But
its impact is likely to be weak. In 2014, India's trade with Pakistan amounted
to under $2.5 billion; by contrast, China traded almost $13 billion worth of
goods with Pakistan that year. India's trade with Pakistan makes up
less than five per cent of Pakistan's total trade.
New
Delhi has to develop pressure points vis-à-vis Islamabad if it is to frame a coherent and purposeful
response and actually take "action" against terror groups in the
region. That means making hard choices.
Take the Pakistan military, for instance - an institution notorious for its
widely publicized patronage of militant groups targeting India, but also an
unlikely starting point.
Pakistan’s
Military personnel –serving and retired- control industry and commerce. Yet, India's self-imposed freeze on dialogue with the
Pakistani army means that none of those businesses have a stake in India. Thus
unless they see normalization with India profitable (economically), we will not
succeed).If Pakistan army officers had deep private
economic interests in India, the Pakistan army would likely be less comfortable
with terrorism across the border.
I
believe that India must first recognize that the Pakistan Army has the final
say in any policy pertaining to India and J&K. This is because the
(presently) Pakistan Army has strategic reasons to keep the fires burning
between our two countries.
Additionally, we
should engage with Pakistan's civil society to
root out political propaganda directed against India across the border. Much of
Islamabad's policy towards India is sustained on a web of ideological poison, portraying New Delhi as an existential
threat to Pakistan (gained much currency after Bangladesh creation). The
propaganda has effectively made the peace process prohibitively costly for
political leaders across Pakistan's spectrum.
Another larger
question is whether international pressure will induce Pakistan to stop
abetting, aiding, training, providing weapons and financing terrorist groups.
Answer, may not be. No other country or group of countries would come forth in
our support. How do we propose to have the major powers (read US and allies)
declare Pakistan a terrorist sponsor state and impose sanctions? Harbouring of
Osama in Pakistan, did not force the US to declare them a sponsor of state
terror or to have any sanctions imposed.Thus, we would
have to deal with Pakistan directly.
India should
also convince US, Canada, UK, China, and Columbia to withdraw
UN Resolution 47 of 1948 which calls for a "free and impartial
plebiscite" in Kashmir. Even if China feels otherwise the others
sponsors can informally announce their position. This one act would deny
Pakistan their so-called right to support perceived freedom movement in
Kashmir. Similarly, Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail must be exposed.
Internally,the
best option against cross-border strike is to protect ourselves. Striking at
will against our military installations must be prevented.
It is
also necessary to find solutions to internal issues. Whatever it takes, it is most essential to have the
population having complete allegiance to the Union of India, whether it is
J&K, NE or Naxal areas. There cannot be a military solution, the population
in these insurgency-prone areas must genuinely believe in the "idea of
India". This is only possible through constructive
dialogue with all the stakeholders.
Lastly,
India must use its economic strength to maintain substantial conventional
military superiority. The defense budget
must be stepped up to the three per cent of GDP to ensure this superiority.
However, military superiority alone is not enough and political will to use it
is imperative.
To
conclude, military diplomatic, political and economic assault must continue
parallely. Indus water, MFN, isolation internationally and regionally, must be
pursued vigorously, to ensure that they feel the pain of being an international
pariah.
9. Conclusion: Human Sufferings
and Economic cost.
Considering the
issues and both side’s position, what can be done?
Even as many participants in
the nightly television discussion shows seem to welcome the prospect of war,
the fact remains that conflict is damaging for both countries – politically and economically. (Remember
our economic hardship post Bangladesh war).
Scarcely do they (war mongers) feel the pain and suffering of the
people, most of whom are poor, living close to
the borders on both sides. Ever since the surgical strikes and the unnecessary hype from metropolitan media studios, lakhs of people have been uprooted overnight to
locations where they are not entirely welcome and have to rely on the charity
of local communities. It is distressing to witness in this harvest season poor
people carrying away their small belongings on bullock-driven carts to uncertain
places. These scenes so ubiquitous these days on media
force a painful recollection of the days of Partition. So the actual question which ought to be asked is whether the
two countries should go to war or not?
Further, according to an
analysis done by the Mumbai-based think-tank Strategic Foresight Group in 2004,
the India-Pakistan conflict already squeezes out 3% of
India’s economic potential,. In a report titled "Cost
of Conflict", the group analyzed military expenditures of the two
countries to conclude that even low-intensity warfare could have “financial
costs, [hurt] human lives and policy losses". Similarly, 3,843 Indian
soldiers and close to 8,000 Pakistani soldiers died during the direct military
confrontation between the two countries in 1971, which ended with the capture
of more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war.
The report sought to chart the
impact of relatively mild confrontations along the border and their resulting
costs. For instance, after the attack on Parliament in 2001. India spent $600
million between December 2001 and January 2002 and Pakistan spent another $400
million. Estimates by the Strategic Foresight Group suggest the two countries
ended up spending more than $3 billion in the short period of time due to
confrontation and the overarching possibility of a nuclear war.
While the group noted that a defense budget cut could release 1% of GDP for India and
nearly 2.5% for Pakistan, it added that Pakistan spends a humongous sum
of money just dealing with international conflicts and internal terror.
Pakistan spent Rs 424 billion in visible and invisible payments to terror outfits and its own military in the year
2004, which was about 10.6% of its GDP then, according to estimates by the
think-tank.
Meanwhile, the global costs of
a potential nuclear war between India and
Pakistan could prove immensely high. More than 21 million
people would be killed, half the ozone layer destroyed and a “nuclear winter”
could affect rains and agriculture across the globe, an analysis by India Spend noted.
The Federation of Indian
Chambers for Commerce and Industry estimated in a report that there is a huge business
cost to the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan as the trade by
value remains small and pales in comparison with trade between India and neighbors such as
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka due to continued tensions.
Gopal Krishna
Gandhi pointed out the futility of the past wars
between the two countries which have reinforced the image of each other as
congenital enemies. From 1947 to 1999 what have the two countries gained
except for feeding triumphalist egos, and dreaming of imaginary victories? The
loss on either side has been more or less same. Bangladesh did come into
existence but it has sown fierce enmity in the military mind of the other
country.
If a new war
breaks out no one knows which direction it will go. But for sure the result of
this war will go beyond rhetoric and vain triumphalism of the two nations. However, no amount of joy or pleasure drawn from victories,
concrete or abstract, can match the tears of people whose dear ones have fed
the roaring war machinery. A war to end war is
only wishful thinking, for wars have only produced war chains; it is only
through peace and dialogues that anxiety and anguish can be vanquished and
greater spiritual victories accomplished.
Even if a country is victorious in a war, the agreements forced on the defeated party become sources of
trouble and mayhem in the future.( 1971 victory sown seed of Punjab and Kashmir
unrest and Kargil war) The WWII was a result of the humiliation heaped
on Germany and her allies. The War-born agreements are scarcely acceptable to
future generations.
How often have
we heard that Shimla Agreement has few owners in Pakistan because the
signatures, according to them, were taken from people who had no other option
after losing on the battle field. Or even the Instrument in Accession in
Kashmir, a document which emerged from a war scene. Fewer documents in modern
history are as controversial and disputed as the IoA, one of the reasons being
that its genesis is war, the latter in more refined language termed as “special
circumstances.”For the overall winning Party it is an article of faith but for
the defeated it is nothing but a piece of paper representing deceit.
On
the contrary, the truce born of relatively equivalent grounds is more
prospective and bears the seeds of long lasting fruit. To begin work on such
peace, the primary duty should be to in the starve the war horses media.
